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Substitute Appellee, Paul H. Richins ("Richins"), petitions this 
Court for a rehearing concerning the corrected decision filed on in 
this case on April 7, 1993. The specific issue sought for review is 
the statement contained under the dictum entitled "Unauthorized 
Practice Of Law", which states: 
"While Richins is free to take assignment of the judgment, 
it wouiq appear that fre is statutorily precluded from 
appearing on his own fctehalf to represent frig interest in 
the matter." (Emphasis added.) 
The Court's original decison in this appeal, dated February 19, 
1993, also contains a dictum entitled "Unauthorized Practice Of Law". 
That dictum also addresses the involvement of Richins in this appeal 
as an assignee of a money judgment and pro se litigant representing 
his own interests. On April 7, 1993, the Court, however, filed a 
corrected opinion which changed certain wording found in the original 
dictum to that described above. Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
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Appellant Procedure, Richins has 14 days after entry of the corrected 
decision to file this Petition For Rehearing. 
Richins requests that the wording of the dictum be deleted or at 
minimum changed so as to eliminate any inuedo, finding or conclusion 
in absence of evidence that Richins was "statutorily precluded from 
appearing on his own behalf to represent his interest in the matter" 
pursuant to UCA 78-51-25. Richins has a constitutional right under 
Article I, Sec. 11, of the Utah Constitution to appear in this appeal 
on "his own behalf" to represent "his interest" in the subject 
judgment, and this guarantee cannot be abrogated by UCA 78-51-25. 
Richins has appeared pro se in this matter on his own behalf, and 
never at any time has he performed legal services or appeared on 
behalf of the original appellee, Lynda Baldwin ("Baldwin"). Richins 
only argued the position of Baldwin to the extent that an affirmation 
of the judgment she retained was necessary for an affirmation of the 
judgment for attorney's fees she sold to Richins. The wording of the 
corrected dictum clearly states "it would appear" otherwise. 
Moreover, the statement in either dictum is completely outside the 
issues and facts of the case and this appeal, and serves no purpose 
accept to "indirectly" charge Richins with violating UCA 78-51-25. 
Moreover, the Court changed the wording of the original dictum 
after receiving a letter from attorney Ronald C. Barker of the 
Unlawful Practice Of Law Committee of the Utah Bar. This letter was 
allegedly written by Mr. Barker in response to a complaint filed with 
the Utah Bar Association by Appellants' attorney, David H. Schwobe. 
In the complaint, Mr. Schwobe alleged that Richins' purchase of the 
subject judgment and his pro se appearance to defend it was a 
violation of UCA 78-51-25. The Court then changed the wording of the 
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dictum to its present form. This Court should not make such a 
sweeping conclusion as it did in the dictum in absence of evidence. 
Richins hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. Richins also requests an answer to this 
petitition for rehearing. 
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
In its 1989 Order and 1989 Partial Summary Judgment ("Property 
Judgment"), the trial court held that Appellant's ("Burtons") 
execution upon Baldwin's property was wrongful and void, and that 
Lynda Baldwin's damages resulting from wrongful execution against her 
property. In its later 1990 Judgment ("Money Judgment"), the trial 
court awarded damages to Lynda Baldwin of $7,872.66, representing her 
attorney's fees in the matter. 
After Burtons appealed the Money Judgment, Richins purchased 
such judgment from Baldwin, and was substituted as appellee in 
Baldwin's place with the consent of Burtons and this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In the trial court, two judgments were entered in favor of 
Baldwin against Burtons, a "Partial Summary Judgment" ("Property 
Judgment"), dated June 21, 1989, which effectively voided a sheriff's 
sale of Baldwin's real property and quieted her title, and a money 
"Judgment" ("Money Judgment"), entered June 4, 1990, which awarded 
attorney's fees of $7,872.77 to Baldwin in the matter. 
2. On July 3r 1990, Appellants filed a "Notice of Appeal" in 
the trial court. The Notice stated that only the Money Judgment was 
being appealed. 
3. On July 13r 1990, Baldwin sold to Richins all of her right, 
title and interest in the Money Judgment, pursuant to an "Assignment 
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of Judgment" ("Assignment"). The Assignment was an unconditional, 
absolute sale of the Judgment to Richins, with H Q duty of Richins to 
defend it in the appeal. 
4. On August 3f 1990, Burtons filed their "Docketing Statement" 
wherein they claimed that the only judgment sought for review was the 
Money Judgment. (See No. 3, page 2; and No. 8, page 14.) 
5. On June 27f 1991 f about one year later, Richins filed a 
"Motion To Substitute Appellee" in this Court in order to substitute 
himself in place of Baldwin for the purpose of defending the appeal 
of the Money Judgment that Baldwin had sold to him. Of significant 
importance is the fact that the Motion was filed pro se
 f and was 
supported the "Affidavit Of Paul Richins" ("Richins Affidavit"), in 
which he detailed his unconditional and absolute purchase of the 
Money Judgment from Baldwin. (See No. 5, page 2.) 
6. Also on June 27
 P 1991, Richins filed a "Motion To Dismiss 
Appeal" with this Court on the ground inter alia that Burtons' Notice 
of Appeal and Docketing Statement designated only the Money Judgment 
for appeal. 
7. On July 10f 1991P Burtons filed a response to Richins' 
Motion To Substitute Appellee, wherein they stipulated on page 1 that 
they did not oppose the substitution: 
APPELIANTS P0 NOT OPPOSE TflE 
PROPOSED SUBSTITUTION OF APPELLEE 
"Based upon the facts represented within paragraph 5 of the 
Affidavit of Paul Richins, dated June 27, 1991 ("Richins 
Affidavit"), and upon the apparent lack of an objection to 
the proposed substitution by Appellee, Lynda C. Baldwin, 
Appellants rate no objects to the prQPQgefl substitution 
of Appellee ip tftis 3gtiQH»" 
5. On July 15, 1991, this Court granted Richins' "Motion To 
Substitute Appellee", notwithstanding the Motion was made pro se, 
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6. On July 15r 1991, Richins filed an "Amended Motion To 
Dismiss Appeal11, wherein he stated on page 3 that he would be 
prejudiced if an appeal of the Property Judgment were allowed and he 
were required to defend the issues thereunder in order to affirm the 
Money Judgment he had bought: 
Substitute Appellee Would Be Prejudiced If An Appeal Of 
The Partial Summary Judgment And Order Were Allowed 
If an appeal of the [Property Judgment 1 and Order is 
allowed to proceed, Substitute Appellee would be prejudiced 
by: 
(a) Having to defend against substantial facts and 
issues completely outside the limited facts and issues 
under the [Money Judgment], i.e., prejudiced by having to 
research the law, file a brief, argue, and otherwise defend 
against a judgment and order not designated for review in 
the Notice of Appeal; 
* * * * * * * * 
(c) Being misled by the contents of the Notice of 
Appeal and the irregular and contradictory Docketing 
Statement filed by Appellants, and specifically not knowing 
what judgment or order and what facts and issues Substitute 
Appellee is required to argue, brief, or otherwise respond 
to." 
5. Therefore, when he purchased the Money Judgment from Baldwin 
in July 1990, Richins had no intention whatsoever of representing her 
interests in the appeal, only his own interests and in collecting the 
Money Judgment for exclusively for himself. In his mind, the 
Property Judgment was not even part of the appeal. He only argued 
the issues under the Property Judgment to the extent necessary to 
affirm his own Money Judgment. 
ARGUMENT I 
Rjchjns Never Intepdqfr Ta- Represent 93ldwin, 
And Had No Agreement To Do So 
There is nothing in the record to show that Richins ever 
intended to represent Baldwin in the case or appeal, nor anything to 
show that Richins had any duty or made any agreement to do so. His 
- 5 -
intentions from the beginning were to represent his own interests pro 
se under the Money Judgment he unconditionally acquired. The Court 
should not charge otherwise, absent evidence to the contrary, and 
particularly after the Court permitted Richins to be substituted in 
place of Baldwin and maintain the appeal pro se. 
ARGUMENT II 
UCA 78-51-25 Does Not Prohibit Richins From Representing 
His Own Interests In Defense Of Money Judgment 
Article I, Sec. 11, of the Utah Constitution states: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due couse of law, which shall be 
adininstered without denial or nnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by liimggff or counsel, any 
civil couse to which he is a party.11 (Emphasis added.) 
Richins became a "party" to the appeal when the Court granted 
his motion to substitute himself as appellee in place of Baldwin. He 
had the right to appear for "himself" if he desired. 
Notwithstanding this constitutional right, UCA 78-51-25 somewhat 
^ntradicts the constitutional right, by stating in pertinent part: 
"No person who is not duly admitted and licensed to pratice 
law within this state ... shall practice or assume to act 
or hold himself out to the public as a person qualified to 
practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within the 
state. 
* * * * * * * * 
"Nothing in this section shall prohibit a person who is 
unlicensed as an attorney from personally representing his 
own interests in a cause to which he is a party in his own 
right and not as assignee." (Emphasis added.) 
The second paragraph in the above statute is very ambiguous and 
leaves all souts of conclusions to the imagination* The statute is 
unconsitututional if it is construed as barring an assignee, the real 
party in interest, from appearing in court to prosecute or defend a 
cause in "his own right" and "on his own behalf." Nelson v. Smith, 
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107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 623 (Utah 1944). However, it is 
constitutional to the extent that a layman appears in court as an 
assignee for the purpose of prosecuting or defending a cause on 
behalf of a third-party who retains a beneficial interest in the 
cause. A copy of the Nelson case is attached hereto. 
The fundamental test under the second paragraph of UCA 78-51-25 
is whether or not the assignee of a cause is prosecuting or defending 
the cause on "his own behalf" or "on behalf of a third-party" who may 
retain a benefical interest in the cause. Under the former, he 
clearly has a constitutional right to appear, but under the latter he 
does not. See also Nelson v. Jacobsenr 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 
1983); Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962); and Lynch v. 
MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962). In the appeal, Richins was 
clearly defending the Money Judgment on his own behalf and not for 
Baldwin who held no interest whatsoever in it, and there is no 
evidence otherwise. 
Moreover, the second paragraph of UCA 78-51-25, if interpreted 
literally, is not only in direct conflict with the above constitu-
tional right but in direct conflict with Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which states: 
"(a) Real Party In Interest. Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. ... 
[Substitution shall have the same effect as if the action 
had been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest." 
An assignee is the real party in interest and entitled to 
maintain the action. Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 
464, 468 (Utah 1962). If he is the real party in interest and 
entitled to maintain the action, Article I, Sec. 11, of the Utah 
Constitution entitles him to prosecute it or defend it "himself". 
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ARGUMENT III 
The Court Permitted Richins To Defend The Appeal Pro Se 
Of significant importance is the fact that Richins entered an 
appearance in this appeal pro se when he filed the "Motion To 
Substitute11 requesting this Court's permission to substitute himself 
as appellee. Included with the Motion To Substitute Appellee was the 
Richins Affidavit which spelled out in detail that Richins had 
unconditionally purchased the Money Judgment from Baldwin and desired 
to be substituted in her place to defend his interest. If this Court 
believes that "he is statutorily precluded from appearing on his own 
behalf to represent his interest in the matter", the Court could have 
easily stopped him then or allowed the "law practice" issue to be 
argued. But the Court didn't. It not only permitted him to be 
substituted as a pro se litigate, but to defend every aspect of the 
appeal thereafter. The Court correctly did so under the unusual 
facts of this case notwithstanding. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1993. 
// fas 
Pa&il H. Richih 
Subst i tu te Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERBVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of April, 1993, I 
personally hand-delivered a true copy of the foregoing intrument to 
the law offices of David H. Schwobe, Esq., attorney for Appellants, 
at PERKINS, SCHWOBE & MCLACHLAN, 343 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
^ y7 . -
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knowledge of the plaintitt. It also snowed 
that the fraud of which plaintiff com-
plained was primarily the fraud of plain-
tiff's agent rather than the fraud of de-
fendant. After pleading such facts, plain-
tiff sought to avoid the bar of limitations 
by merely pleading that it had not discov-
ered the fraud earlier. This court held 
that where one admits he was in possession 
of all the facts upon which he seeks to 
predicate fraud (and he is charged with 
knowledge of the law) he cannot avoid the 
bar of the statute unless he pleads facts 
to show why he was unaware of the facts 
which he now claims constituted a fraud. 
I find nothing in the investment company 
case which even implies a holding that 
in a case such as this it is necessary to 
plead more fully than here done to avoid 
the bar of the limitations statute. 
MOFFAT, J., deceased. 
W. B. BENNION et at., Plaintiffs, Franklin 
R. Brough et al., Appellants, v. FIRST 
FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION et al., Respondents. 
No. 6668. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 27, 1944. 
Appeal from District Court, Third Judi-
cial District, Salt Lake—County^ B ^ R 
Leverich, Judge. 
E. A. Walton and Parnell Black, both of 
Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Farnsworth & Van Cott and Senior & 
Senior, all of Salt Lake City, for respond-
ents. 
WOLFE, Chief Justice. 
This case is controlled by our decision 
in the case of Nunnelly et al. v. Ogden 
First Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, 154 P.2d 620. The facts are substan-
1 Ruckcnbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 
133 P.2d 325, 144 A.L.R. 839. 
2 Wines v. Railway Co., 9 Utah 228, 
33 P. 1042; Rutan v. Huck, 30 Utah 
217, 83 P. 833; Baglin v. Earl-Eagle 
piaintms ana aetenaants. ine judgment 
of dismissal is vacated and the cause is 
remanded to the district court, for the 
reasons set forth in the Nunnelly case, 
and the plaintiffs are granted leave to 
amend the complaint and to proceed in ac-
cordance with said decision of this court. 
Each party shall pay his or its own costs. 
LARSON, MCDONOUGH, WADE, and 
TURNER, JJ., concur. 
'O 5 ro NUMBER SYSTEM, 
NELSON et al., Com'rs of State Bar, et al. v. 
SMITH et al. 
No. 6700. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1SM4. 
1. Attorney and client <§=>32 
The state has right and duty to reg-
ulate practice of law in order to promote 
the public welfare. Utah Code 1943, 6— 
0—24.1 
2. Attorney and client <§=>! 
The Legislature has power, in order 
to enforce regulations to. practice law, to 
declare acts of unauthorized practice of 
law to be illegal and punish violation there-
of. Utah Code 1943, 6—0—24. 
3. Attorney and client <§=>62 
The right to appear in person and 
prosecute or defend a cause to which he 
is a party cannot be abrogated either by 
Legislature or court. Const, art. 1, § 11. 
4. Attorney and client <®=362 
The statute penalizing the unauthoriz-
ed practice of law if construed as pro-
hibiting an assignee from appearing in 
court to prosecute or defend a cause of 
action would be unconstitutional and void, 
since an assignee is a real party in in-
terest even though the assignment be only 
for the purpose of a suit. Utah Code 
1943, 6—0—24; Const, art. 1, § 11* 
Min. Co., 54 Utah 572, 184 P. 190; Moss 
v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515; 
Perkes v. Utah-Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah 
217, 39 P.2d 308. 
The "practice of law", within statute 
penalizing the unauthorized practice of law, 
involves the carrying on of the calling of 
an attorney usually for gain and consists 
of .giving advice, as such, acting in a rep-
resentative capacity and rendering services 
to others, and does not include one act-
ing for himself. Utah Code 1943, 6—0— 
K 
Sec Words and Phrases. Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions ot 
"Practice of Law". 
6. Attorney and client <§=>62 
The statute penalizing the unauthorized 
j r a c t i c e o ^ a w , one of the elements of 
wmenistTi^renaering of legal services 
or giving of legal advice to another usu-
ally tor gain, is not violative ol the con-
stitutional provision which permits an in-
dividual to appear tor himself in a prose-
cution or defense of a cause. Utah Code 
1943, 6—0—24; Const, art. 1, § 11. 
7. Injunction <S=>II8(3) 
Suit to enjoin defendants from ille-
gally practicing law, alleging that defend-
ants as laymen conducted their business 
for purpose of bringing legal actions on 
claims owned by third parties and consist-
ing of payment of all costs and furnish-
ing of all legal services incident thereto 
whereby third parties agreed that defend-
ants might retain certain per cent, of sum 
recovered for their own use, stated cause 
of action. Utah Code 1943, 6—0—24. 
8. Attorney and client <§=?ll 
A layman cannot circumvent statute 
prohibiting practice oi law by party not 
properly licensed as attorney by device of 
taking assignment of the claim and pro-
ceeding in his own name. Utah Code 
1543, 6—fl—24; Const, art. 1, § 11. 
9. Attorney and client <§=>l I 
Casual assignment of claim to person 
not licensed as attorney to bring suit in 
his own name, made for procedural and 
administrative convenience, is not within 
prohibition of statute forbidding laymen to 
practice law. Utah Code 1943, 6—0—24. 
10. Attorney and client <&=62 
The constitutional provision designed 
to insure right of party to appear in his 
own behalf in court would not protect col-
lection agency's practice of rendering legal 
services to others in violation of statute 
prohibiting one unlicensed as attorney to 
ment of claim. Utah Code iy-to, u—v—^~r, 
Const, art. 1, § 11. 
11. Attorney and client <§=>ll 
The fact that collection agency in some 
instances employed a regularly licensed at-
torney to prepare legal papers and conduct 
trial of a suit would not legalize agen-
cy's conduct which would otherwise con-
stitute illegal practice of law. Utah Code 
1943, 6—0—24. 
12. Injunction C=89 
Under pleading that defendants were 
illegally practicing law, injunction was 
proper remedy, notwithstanding such con-
duct would constitute a criminal offense. 
Utah Code 1943, 6—0—24. 
Appeal from District Court, Second Dis-
trict, Weber County; A. H. Ellett, Judge. 
Suit by Joseph E. Nelson and others, 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, in 
behalf of themselves and all licensed at-
torneys at law of the State of Utah, against 
D. D. Smith and another, doing business 
as the Service Collection Company, to en-
join defendants from allegedly unlawful 
practice of law. From an order sustaining 
a demurrer to the complaint and dismissing 
it, plaintiffs appeal. 
£ keversed^p 
Brigham E. Roberts and L. O. Thomas, 
both of Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Howell, Stine & Olmstead, of Ogden, for 
respondents. 
WOLFE, Chief Justice. 
Suit for an injunction. The defendants 
demurred to the complaint and the demur-
rer was sustained. Upon plaintiffs' failure 
to plead over the complaint was dismissed. 
The correctness of the ruling on demur-
rer is questioned by this appeal. 
From the complaint it appears that the 
plaintiffs are the duly elected Commission-
ers of the Utah State Bar. It is alleged 
that the defendants, doing business under 
the assumed name and style of Service 
Collection Company, are unlawfully prac-
ticing law in violation of Section 6—0—24, 
U.C.A.1943. The suit is brought to enjoin 
further unlawful practice of law. 
The manner in which the alleged un-
lawful practice of law is carried on by the 
defendants is set forth in the complaint 
the defendants are by personal contact and 
by advertising and writing, soliciting from 
the general public the placement with them 
(defendants) of various commercial ac-
counts and claims for the payment of mon-
e> for collection The defendants agree 
to proceed to collect the same, to bring 
suit if necessary, to pay all court costs 
and furnish all legal services incident 
thereto in consideration of the agreement 
b> the owners to permit the defendants 
to deduct and retain for their own use a 
fi\ed percentage of any sum recovered It 
is alleged that the accepting and engaging 
in the collection of such claims is conduct-
ed as a business, that claims for collec-
tion are accepted both as agent for said 
persons and as assignee of the claims 
In the process of collecting such claims 
it is alleged that the defendants have fur-
nished and are furnishing all costs and all 
legal services incident thereto and "have 
prepared and filed in various courts of this 
State, complaints, affidavits, praecipes and 
other legal documents, and have prepared 
summons and caused them to be issued and 
sened, and sued out garnishments, attach-
ments and orders to show cause, and have 
prepared judgments and procured them to 
be signed and entered by the said Courts, 
and sued out executions and procured the 
institution of and have conducted supple-
mentary proceedings and they still continue 
to do and are now doing all of said acts " 
The defendants also allegedly hold them-
sehes out to the public as being compe-
tent to give and do give legal advice 
The complaint alleges that over 22% of 
all civil actions brought in the City Court 
of Ogden, Weber County, during a period 
of about one year were suits instituted by 
the defendants in their own names as as-
signees of the real owner of the claims; 
that the purported assignments were and 
are "sham and a fraud upon the court" 
and have been and are being made purely 
for the purpose of enabling the defend-
ants to evade and circumvent the provi-
sions of the statutes of the State of Utah 
relating to the practice of law by per-
sons not licensed to do so. 
The prayer is for an inj'unction to re-
strain the defendants from soliciting or 
recen ing assignments of claims or accounts 
for the purpose of suit thereon; furnish-
ing legal service or advice with respect to 
any such account or otherwise or to rep-
to do so, instituting, prosecuting, manag 
ing or tr\ing anv suit upon an assigned 
account, note or other chose in action of 
which defendants are not the sole owners 
of all interest therein, both legal and eq-
uitable, instituting, prosecuting, managing 
or trying any suit or legal proceeding for 
any person, firm or corporation other than 
themsehes, agreeing or promising to pay 
court costs, furnish legal services incident 
to the bringing of a legal action upon 
claims assigned for collection, or prepir-
mg or filing either by themselves or by 
an attorne> any complaint, process, writ or 
other legal papers or causing any legal writ 
or process to be issued or served in any 
suit or proceeding placed with them for 
collection or in which any other firm or 
corporation has any beneficial interest 
Section 6—0—24, U C A 1943 provides-
"Any person not duly admitted and li-
censed to practice law within this state, 
or whose right or license to practice there-
in shall ha\e terminated either by disbar-
ment, suspension, failure to pay his license 
fee or otherwise, who practices or assumes 
to act or hold himself out to the public 
as a person qualified to practice or carry 
on the calling of a lawyer within this state, 
is guilty of an offense, and shall be fined 
not to exceed $500, or be imprisoned for 
a period ot not to exceed six months, 
or both, and, if he shall have been ad-
mitted to practice law, he shall in addi-
tion be subject to suspension under the 
proceedings proi ided by this title -
"Nothing in this section shall prohibit 
one unlicensed as an attorney from per- * 
sonally representing his own interests in \ 
a cause to which he is a party in his 
own right and not as assignee, nor shall 
anything herein contained prevent an un-
licensed person, duly elected to the office 
of county attorney, from performing the 
duties of such office " 
The respondents contend that the stat-
ute quoted above is unconstitutional in that 
it is in conflict with Article I, Section 11 
of the Constitution of Utah, which pro-
vides : 
"All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him m his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unneces-
sary delay, and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any 
sel, any cuil cause to which he is a par-
ty" 
[1,2] In Ruckenbrod v Mullins, 102 
Utah 54S, 133 P2d 325, 144 A L R 839, 
the relationship of the attorney to the court 
was dibcussed in detail We recognized 
that the legislature miy in the proper ex-
ercise of its police powers make reason-
able regulations governing the admission 
and disbarment of attorneys The practice 
of liw is so affected with the public in-
terest that the state has both a right and 
a duty to control and regulate it in or-
der to promote the public welfare To 
enforce the regulations the legislature has 
the power to declare acts of unauthorized 
practice of law to be illegal and to punish 
violations thereof by fine and imprison-
ment In re Opinion of the Justices, 2S9 
Mass 607, 194 N E 313 But aside from 
any legislative enactment the courts inher-
ent^ have the power to control and pre-
scribe the conditions upon which one may 
be admitted as a member of the bar As 
we noted in the Ruckenbrod case, supra, 
courts have retained the ultimate right to 
control admission to practice and disbar-
ment By so doing, the courts "have un-
dertaken to protect the honor and high 
standing of the legal profession by refus-
ing to admit those applicants who lack the 
necessary educational qualifications or 
who are morally incompetent, and dropping 
from the rolls those guilty of misconduct " 
[102 Utah 548, 133 P2d 331 ] It was fur-
ther noted that the attorney has become 
an indispensable part of our judicial ma-
chinery Persons unlearned in the law can 
neither aid a litigant nor the court and 
both the court and the public have an in-
terest in seeing that those who lack the 
necessary educational and moral standards 
do not hold themselves out as being com-
petent and qualified to give legal advice 
and perform legal services preparatory to 
commencing an action in the court It is 
the attorney who first sits as judge of 
the merits of every case, who decides 
whether or not suit should be commenced 
The court and the public are interested 
in having that decision rendered by those 
qualified so to do to avoid, as much as 
possible, needless litigation and to have 
those cases upon which suits are deemed 
advisable properly prepared so that they 
will move through the process of trial with 
as few snarls as possible The public is 
the machinery set up for the purpose of 
handling judicial work In the mitter of 
In re Opinion of the Justices, supra, 289 
Mass 607, 194 N E 313, 317, the court 
noted that 
"No valid distinction, so fir as concerns 
the questions set forth in the order, can 
be drawn between thit part of the work 
of the lawyer which involves appearance 
in court and that part which imoWcs ad 
vice and drafting of instruments in his 
office The work of the office lawyer is 
the groundwork for future possible con 
tests in courts It has profound effect on 
the whole scheme of the administration of 
justice It is performed with that possi-
bility in mind, and otherwise would hard 
ly be needed In this country the prac-
tice of law includes both forms of legal 
service, there is no separation, as in Eng 
land, into barristers and solicitors It is 
of importance to the welfire of the pub 
lie that these manifold customary functions 
be performed by persons possessed of ade 
quate learning and skill, of sound moral 
character, and acting at all times under the 
heavy trust obligation to clients which rests 
upon all attorne>s The underljmg rea-
sons which prevent corporations, associa-
tions and individuals other than members 
of the bar from appearing before the 
courts apply with equal force to the per-
formance of these customary functions of 
attorneys and counsellors at law outside 
of courts Decisions of the courts, some 
of which deal with statutes, are unanimous 
on these points, so far as we are aware 
[Citing cases in footnotes] If these es-
tablished principles as to the practice of 
law are ever to be changed, the judicial 
department of the government must act to 
that end " 
[3,4] In view of Article I, Section 11 
(quoted above) of the State Constitution, 
no person ma> be barred from prosecut 
ing or defending before any state tribun-
al by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party While this does 
not give a person appearing in his own 
behalf any special privileges not accorded 
to other litigants appearing by counsel, and 
he is amenable to the administrative pow-
ers of the court, the ruzht to aPPear m 
person and prosecute or deiend a cause 
to which he is a party"cannot be abro^at^ 
ed either by the legislature or the courts 
In numerous cases we liave "field" that an 
though trie assignment be onlyTorfhe pur-
pose of suit See Wines v kaiiwav Co, 
9 Utah 228; 33 P 1042, Rutan v Huck, 
30 Utah 217, 83 P 833, Baghn v Earl 
Eagle Mining Co, 54 Utah 572 1S4 P 
190, Moss v Ta>lor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P 
515, Perkes v Ut ih Idaho Milk Co, 85 
Utah 217 39 P2d 308 An assignee, be 
ing a party is gnen, the right by the 
Constitution to^appear ifl_court to prose-
cute or defend the cause_ l l bection 6-~ 
U—J4 must be construed ^s providing con 
trary, it is unconstitutional and void 
The first paragraph of Section 6—(5—24 
(quoted above) prohibits any person not 
duly licensed to practice law in this state, 
from practicing law or from holding him 
self out to the public as a person qualified 
to practice or carry on the calling of a 
lawyer The second paragraph was prob 
ably added because of an apprehension that 
the courts would construe the first para-
graph as prohibiting one from appearing 
in a cause to which he was a party, which 
construction would have rendered the stat-
ute unconstitutional This second para-
graph contains no restrictions If there 
are any restrictions in Section 6—0—24 
which are in conflict with the constitu-
tional provision discussed above, such re-
strictions must be spelled out of the lan-
guage of the first paragraph 
[5] The prohibition against the prac-
tice of law contained in Section 6—0—24 
is not in conflict with the constitutional 
provision guaranteeing the right of an in 
dividual to appear and defend or prose-
cute a cause to which he is a party In-
dividuals have longf been permitted to man-
age, prosecute and defend their own ac-
tions, but this is not considered to peTEg 
practice ot law See xn re Opinion of 
the Judges, 2^'Mass 607, 194 N E 313 
I One does not practice law by acting for 
himself^ny'more than he practices mea-
icine by rendering first aid to himself 
(Tie practice 01' law)'!'nfl UgrPlmpossi pTT?f 
/exact definition,1 "inVOlves~tnT carrying on 
loTire'^aTIrfrf^f'aff^torney u T u a t g ^ 
f ga^n^n^rC^gTsiy prgTving advice, a ? ^ 3 C 
acting "in a^epreselitafive capacity and ren-
i dering ~seTvu?es To others See" Liberty 
lIuF Inl "Co"'v"7onesT744 Mo 932, 130 
S VV2d 945, 125 A L R 1149, In re Opin 
ion of the Judges, supra, Fink v Peden, 
214 Ind 584, 17 N E 2d 95, State v C S 
Dudley & Co, 340 Mo 852, 102 S W 2 d 
895 
seen that there is no conflict between the 
quoted constitutional provision and Section 
6—0—24 The former relates to the right 
of an mdrwdual to appear for himself m 
the prosecution or defense of a cause The 
latter is a prohibition against fitacticinq 
lazy, one of. the elements of/vvnicnisTie 
rendering Vf legaT^cryice or Eming 
of legal advice to another usually for gam 
[7] Under the adjudicated cases the 
complaint alleges tacts which .show that 
the respondents are ' praTcticing I^aw" Inf-
erence to the ''complaint discloses that the 
respondents are allegedly holding them 
selves out as Qualified...^Jgj^gj^aife 
giving advice to others, that they anTpre 
paring and filing pleadings, suing out gar 
nishments, attachments, etc ,^ preparing 
judgments and procuring thenTto be signed 
and entered by the courts, procuring the 
institution of supplementary proceeding's 
arid conductingth^jarhe, etc^Tfie'j)e_r-"^ 
formance "oTthese " c^ts^  J^^gSjfijjg- consti 5&\ 
tutes the practice of law bee In re Dun J 
ckn,1^ scTssrvrrE 210,24 LRA, 
N S , 750, 18 AnnCas 657, In re Ripley, 
109 Vt 83, 191 A 918, People v People's 
Stockyards State Bank, 344 111 462, 176 
N E 901, \ount v Zarbell, 17 Wash 2d 
278, 135 P2d 309, In re Shoe Mfrs Pro 
techve Assn, Inc, 295 Mass 369, 3 N E 
2d 746, Liberty Mut Ins Co v Jones, 344 
Mo 932, 130 S W 2 d 945, 955, 125 A L 
R 1149, and annotation at 1173 In the 
Liberty Mutual Ins Co case, the court 
noted that 
"While a layman may represent himself 
in court, he cannot even on a single oc-
casion represent another, whether for a 
consideration or not And a corporation 
cannot represent itself in court at any time 
but must appear by attorney On the oth-
er hand the doing of any single act out 
of court in a representative capacity that 
a lawyer mightrdo will not necessarily con-
vict a la> man of engaging in the law busi-
ness * * * The holding out may be 
evidenced by repeated acts indicating a 
course of conduct, or by the exaction of 
a consideration." 
things - ^ ~ ~ ^ ^ 
and it ^TUst"Bliield that the demurrer was 
improperly sustained 
The question as to whether the defend-
ants are illegally engaging in the practice 
claims in their hands for collection, Hav-
ing an assignment of the claim made to 
them, and then proceeding in their own 
names as assignees to prepare legal papers, 
institute law suits, manage and conduct 
supplemental proceedings, employ counsel, 
etc, really presents two problems First, 
can they proceed in their own names as 
assignees to do the work themselves, and 
second, can they institute, manage and con 
trol proceedings and preparation of legal 
pipers by employing a licensed attorney to 
do the work for them? 
[8] We believe that both of these ques 
tions must be answered in the negative 
The authorities almost uniformly hold that 
laymen cannot evade and circunnent a 
sTaTute*luch as our Section 6—0=24 %*jffg 
device of taking an assignment of Ihe 
claim and proceedings in their own names 
See State "v 7arr»cs SanfonT Agency, "To7 
Tenn 339, 69 S W 2d 895, People v Se-
curities Discount Corp 279 111 App 70, 
affirmed 361 111 551, 198 N E 681, Grau 
stein v Barry, 315 Mass 518, 53 N E 2 d 
568, Bump v Dist Ct, 232 Iowa 623, 5 
N W 2 d 914, Gill v Richmond Coop 
Ass'n, 309 Mass 73, 34 N E 2d 509 
The defendants take the position that the 
constitutional provision, Art I, Sec 11, dis-
cussed above gives them the right to pro-
ceed as assignees to do the various things 
of which the plaintiffs complain We have 
already noted that an assignee is a party 
within, the meaning~~oi the ConstjTuHonal 
provision even though Jne"" assignment be 
only for purpose pi brinjing suff^ But this 
folding is"not 'determinative ot this point 
Before one may proceed in the courts to 
prosecute a claim in which "another, jias 
a beneficiarinterest it 1musT*b~(Pdetermined 
wteTnfPoTTtoTTn^ Was'made 
to accomplish an lilegaTT^pqse Section IO ^nji i igaQmj^os -
»CHg3gprTCTts lhe practice of law by 
laymen The courts themselves will_not 
P£inHLl^!lSE.t£Jl££^Lr , n c o u r i i f l a J ^ 
resentative capacity ThT~policy ofThe 
courts and the leglslaTure J n _ ^ j ^ e g a £ d 
mayliot bejcircumventebTSy'the" sITSteriuge 
of a layman "talcmg^an assignmenXJ&j^er-
mit him to carry'on t R business of prac-
ticing law 
JC [9] The casual assignment for proce-
Mffdural convenience falls in an entirely dit 
/ ferent" class t!ee comment in Craustein v 
garry, 315Tlass 518, 53 N E.2d S6& The 
DUSineb5 UI tuiav-m
 fe w .J 
Rither such assignments are mide for pro 
cedural and administrative convenience and 
permit groups of persons collectively to 
pursue a similar or common right There 
may well be legitimate purposes for the tak-
ing of an assignment by one engiged in the 
business of collecting chim< fainBtofr 
But collection agencies as a part ot tfieir 
business of serving others, clearly should 
not be permitted to prepare legal papers, 
commence suits, appear in court, prepare 
judgments and generally manage law suits 
for its various customers See cases hbt 
cited It does not matter what particular 
form or name they give their procedure 
the practice of furnishing or performing 
legal services for another is esscntiall) the 
same 
When the defendants solicit the place-
ment of claims with them for collection, 
they are asking third parties to allow them 
to render the service of collecting thf 
clairrr^fonaiTmeTne collection agency 
ITaT^bsolutely no interest, either legal or 
beneficial, in the claim The only interest 
they ever get comes by virtue of a prom-
ise to prosecute the claim Courts cannot 
remain blind to the fact that the assign 
ment of the claim to the defendants for 
collection is not made as a gratuity The 
percentage of the amount collected which 
Is^BoWed to the defendants is given to 
?C™ Inr mie purpose only,''to compensate 
them J o j services^ rendered in tY^coUe^-
ti^rr^reoJ7"\Vhere the collection prac 
See lnVoTvefthe preparing of legal papers 
furnishing legal advice and other legal 
services the compensation allowed must be 
assumed T7T ne m part allowed to pay for 
the legal services so render eel No matter 
now~oneTooks af i£ triis constitutes the 
rendering of legal services for others as 
a regular part of a business carried on for 
financial gam This essential fact cannot 
be hidden by the subterfuge of an assign 
ment The assignment itself if used to 
permit this practice, is for an illegal pur 
pose and one proceeding under such an 
assignment is not protected by the .con, 
stitutional provision giving one Jhe_nghj 
to appear lojljhe purpose ' oT^seeut ing 
oT'detendinX^"^^5^"^^^^ ^^1S a p - r 
ty~See~ comment in Rae v Cameron 112 
Mont 159 114 P2d 1060 (modifying State 
ex rcl rreeboum v Merchants Credit 
SeiMce \04 Mout 76 66 P2d 337) in 
ior an niegai purpose. 
[10] The taking of an assignment un-
der circumstances such as those detailed 
above cannot possibly change the essential 
fact that the defendants are rendenng_Je-
gal services for another for ga*",, A he 
constitutional provisTonaesigiica to insure 
the right of a party to appear in his own 
behalf neither authorizes nor protects the 
practice of the defendants of rendering le-
gal services to others by adopting the form 
of an assignment Though the state will 
not interfere if an individual desires to 
conduct his own legal atrairs without trie 
aid of counsel* 'trje^pup'Iic^interest demands 
Suit no person" lTold"TnmseTF^ouf~to ^the 
public as qualified to render legal*servlce"s 
^o ro the r s unless he in fact is scwjualf-
n e a D u m p v. Dist qual Ct , 232 Iowa 623, 5 tied 13ump 
N W 2d 914 
The legislature, in the proper exercise 
of its police powers, has restricted the 
practice of the law to those meeting speci-
fied standards Those who meet the re-
quired standards and who follow the pre-
scribed procedure may be licensed to prac-
tice law. All those not licensed according 
to the prescribed procedure are conclusive-
ly presumed to be incompetent to carry 
on the calling of an attorney. 
[11] The fact that the defendants in 
some instances employ a regularly li-
censed attorney to prepare necessary legal 
papers and conduct the trial of a suit 
does not make their conduct legal. One 
cannot do through an employee or an agent 
that which he cannot do by himself. If 
the attorney is in fact the agent or em-
ployee of the lay agency, his acts are the 
acts of his principal or master. When an 
attorney represents an individual or cor-
poration, he acts as a servant or agent. 
Since he acts for others in a representa-
ti\ e capacity, doing those things which are 
customarily done by an attorney, he prac-
tices law within the meaning of Section 
6—0—24. The same conduct on the part 
of laymen would likewise be the practice 
of law, and since said layman would be 
unlicensed, such practice would be illegal 
The prohibition against the practice of law 
by a layman contained in Section 6—0—24 
applies alike to the practice by a layman 
directly and in person and to the indirect 
practice through an agent or employee 
It is immaterial that said layman may se-
jaw I I ine attorney DC in iact tnc agent 
or emplo>ee of a layman, his act is that 
of the la> man (his pnncipal) Such prin-
cipal would be engaging in the illegal prac-
tice of law if he through such an agent 
rendered legal services to a third party 
for compensation and as a reguTarana 
customary business practice. 
Thus, In re G H Ottcrncss, 181 Minn 
254, 232 N W 318, 320, 73 A L R 1319^  
the defendant was held to be illegally prac-
ticing law under the following circumstanc-
es The defendant, a duly licensed mem-
ber of the bir, was emplo>ed by a bank 
as vice president on a fixed annual salary. 
In addition to his duties with the bank 
he was permitted to engage in the law 
practice performing acts both for the bank 
and for various third parties All fees 
collected from said third parties were 
turned over to the bank and were to be 
treated as income of the bank. Disciplina-
ry action was brought against the defend-
ant vice president. In holding that the de-
fendant should be "severely censured 
* * * for participating in the practice 
of law by a banking corporation" the court 
noted: 
"There can be no objection to the hir-
ing of an attorney on an annual salary 
basis by banks, other corporations, firms, 
or individuals, to attend to and conduct 
its or their legal business An attorney so 
emploved may, as attorney for his employ-
er, foreclose mortgages owned by such em-
plover, and may include the proper attor-
ney's fees therefor in the foreclosure 
charges, so long as such fees are covered 
by and paid to him out of his salary 
and do not exceed what is actually paid 
to him or result in any profit to the 
employer See Swift v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 76 Minn. 194, 78 N W. 
1107. But neither a corporation nor a 
layman, not admitted to practice, can prac-
tice law, nor indirectly practice law by 
hiring a licensed attorney to practice law 
forothers for the benefit and profit oi 
suchhirerT For this bank to employ de-
fendant to conduct law business generally 
for others, for the benefit and profit of 
the bank, amounted to the unlawful prac-
tice of law by the bank, and was mis-
conduct both on the part of the bank and 
this defendant, who was a participant there-
in." 
held 
"A corporation can neither practice law 
nor hire la\\\ers to carry on the business 
of pi icticing law for it * * * 1 hough 
all the directors and officers of the cor-
poi ition be duly licensed members of the 
legil piofcssion, the practice of law by the 
corporation would be illegal nevertheless " 
In an annotation in 73 A L R 1328, the 
aiinotator notes thit "As will appear from 
the subsequent discussion of the ca«=es, there 
is no judicial dissent from the proposition 
that a corporation cannot practice law" 
(citing a number of cases ) Then follows 
a statement of the theory of the rule A 
quotation from the case of Re Co oper 
ative Law Co , 198 N Y 479, 92 N E 15, 
16, 32 L R A ,N S , 55, 139 Am St Rep 839, 
19 Ann Cas 879, show s that the ru'e is 
based upon the considerations of the es-
sential nature of the practice of the law 
and the desire to make the attorney di-
rectl) amenable to the client rather than 
to some intervening master or principal 
The court noted that. 
"The relation of attorney and client is 
that of master and servant in a limited 
and dignified sense, and it involves the 
highest trust and conhdence It cannot be 
delegated without consent, and it cannot 
exist between an attorney employed by a 
corporation to practice law for it, and a 
client of the corporation, for he would be 
subject to the directions of the corpora-
tion, and not to the directions of the cli-
ent There would be neither contract nor 
privity between him and the client, and 
he would not owe even the duty of coun-
sel to the actual litigant The corporation 
would control the litigation, the money 
earned would belong to the corporation, 
and the attorney would be responsible to 
the corporation only His master would 
not be the client but the corporation, con-
ducted it may be wholly by laymen, or-
ganized simply to make money and not 
to aid in the administration of justice which 
is the highest function of an attorney and 
counselor at law" 
Then at page 1331 of the annotation 
there is a discussion of attempts by cor-
porations to shield themselves behind a duly 
aufhonzed attorney One statement from 
Re Co-operative Law Co, supra, may be 
of interest here 
134 P 2d—41 
plO)ing competent lawyers to practice tor 
it, as that would be an evasion which the 
law would not tolerate" 
The annotation then contains a number 
of illustrations applvang the rule against 
corporate praetice of law to various fact 
situations 
In Rosenthal v Shepard Broadcasting 
Service, Inc, 299 Mass 286, 12 i\ E 2d 
819, 114 A L R 1502, the court held that 
a radio station broadcasting a progr im 
consisting of the giving of legal adwee to 
selected persons \ ho wrote m for legal 
advice was practicing law This case like 
thobe cited next above involved the at-
tempt of the la> agenc) to practice law 
through emplovees or agents, who were 
licensed attornejs These cases stand 
clearly for the proposition that a lav man 
or la> agency cannot directly or indireet 
ly practice law and the prohibition reaches 
those situations where the lay agencv. or 
lav man seeks shelter behind an employee 
or agent who is a licensed attorney 
The complaint alleges that the defend 
ants in the instant case solicited the place-
ment of claims with them for collection, 
that they promised the owners of the 
claims that the> would bring legal aetions 
thereon in the appropriate courts in the 
State of Utah, that they promised and 
agreed at their own expense to pay all 
costs and to furnish all legal serviees in 
cident thereto, all in consideration of the 
agreement of the owners of said claims 
to permit the defendants to deduct and re 
tain for their own use a fixed percentage 
of all sums of money actually collected on 
said claims and accounts as a result of 
the defendants' said services 
Under these allegations it is clear that 
any attorney furnished to perform the le 
gal services which the defendants agree, 
as a usual business practice, to perform 
or cause to be performed would be the 
employee of the defendants There would, 
under these circumstances, be no contract 
or privity between the owners of the va-
rious claims and the attorne>s furnished 
by the defendants The fee allowed by 
the owners of the claims to compensate 
defendants for the services rendered are 
deducted by the defendants for their own 
use and benefit 'I he services so rendered 
are such as are usuall} and customarily 
rendered by an attorney in the practice 
of his profession. Under the allegations 
any attorney retained to perform such serv-
ices in the enforcement of such claims 
would be the defendants' employee or agent. 
Such a business conducted for the pur-
pose of bringing legal actions on claims 
owned by third parties and consisting of 
the payment of all costs and the furnish-
ing of all legal services incident to the 
bringing of the actions is the practice of 
law. Where, as here, the agency render-
ing the service is a lay agency, it is the 
illegal practice of law. Such is the al-
most uniform holding of the authorities as 
applied to collection agencies operating 
along similar lines. See In re Tuthill, 256 
App.Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643; Richmond 
Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 
Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153; Midland Credit Adj. 
Co. v. Donnelly, 219 Ill.App. 271; In re 
Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass'n., Inc., 295 
Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746; State v. C. S. 
Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 
895; In the Matter of Co-Operative Co., 
198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 32 L.R.A.,N. 
S., 55, 139 Am.St.Rep. 839, 19 Ann.Cas. 
879; State ex rel. Freebourn v. Merchants' 
Credit Service, 104 Mont. 76, 66 P.2d 337 
as modified by Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 
159, 114 P.2d 1060. 
The public has long been interested in 
the protection of the trust relationship be-
tween an attorney and his client. Numer-
ous restrictions have been placed upon the 
office of an attorney to insure to the cli-
ent that the attorney will hold his client's 
best interest to be paramount to any oth-
er consideration except his duty as an of-
ficer of the court. Thus while a lavman 
may have an agent select an attorney for 
him and even deal with the attorney 
through the agent, the attorney must in 
fact represent the purported principal rath-
er than the purported agent. The inter-
jection of the collection agency between 
the client and the attorney so that the 
attorney would be answerable to the col-
lection agency as principal would come 
within this objection. See cases last cited 
above. The collection agencies perhaps 
perform functions which are both conven-
ient and necessary in the field of business 
today and they are no doubt equipped to 
perform such functions. But when a col-
lection agency undertakes to bring lawsuits 
on the claims of third parties and perform 
the necessary legal services incident there-
to (even though they function through li-
censed attorneys), they are practicing law 
within the meaning of Section 6—0—24. 
They being lay agencies, such practice of 
law is illegal and prohibited. 
[12] The pleadings disclose that the de-
fendants are illegally practicing law and 
therefore states a cause of action for in-
junctive relief. If the facts alleged can 
be proved the defendants should be en-
joined from directly or indirectly render-
1
 ing legal services for others and from so-
liciting claims under an agreement that 
they will bring and prosecute actions there-
on in the courts. As to injunction being 
the proper remedy, see Depew v. Wichita 
Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P. 
2d 1041, certiorari denied, 297 U.S. 710, 56 
S.Ct 574, 80 L.Ed. 997; State Bar of 
Oklahoma v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 170 Okl. 
246, 37 P.2d 954; Paul v. Stanley, 168 
Wash. 371, 12 P^d 401. 
Judgment reversed. Costs to appellants. 
LARSON and TURNER, JJ., and M. J. 
BRONSON, District Judge, concur. 
McDONOUGH, J., concurs in the result. 
WADE, J., being disqualified, did not 
participate herein. 
[O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM-
GLENN v. KEYES et ux. 
No. 6753. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1914. 
1. War <§=>4 
The purpose of rules of Office of Price 
Administration relating to housing ac-
commodations in defense rental areas is to 
restrain unnecessary evictions, but not to 
hamper alienation of property. 
2. Landlord and tenant <S=5278'/2 
War <S=>4 
Under rule of Office of Price Ad-
ministration, the unreasonable refusal by 
tenant to allow landlord access to housing 
accommodations for inspection or of show-
ing them to prospective purchaser is 
ground for removal unless such right i* 
contrary to lease. 
fcfl^ENN v. 
Cite as 154 
3. Landlord and tenant C=>29l(8) 
Unlawful detainer action for posses-
sion of premises in defense rental area, 
properly brought under statute on ground 
that tenants refused landlord access to 
premises for inspection and refused to 
show premises to prospective purchasers, 
without alleging that landlord had right 
thereto under lease, stated cause of ac-
tion, since lack of such right would be 
matter of defense. Utah Code 1943, 104— 
60—3. 
Appeal from District Court, First Dis-
trict, Box Elder County; M. M. Morrison, 
Judge. 
Action by Lee Glenn against John E. I. 
Keyes and wife in unlawful detainer to 
recover possession of leased premises. 
From a judgment sustaining a demurrer 
to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Thatcher & Young, of Ogden, for 
appellant. 
No appearance for respondent. 
WADE, Justice. 
Plaintiff below and appellant herein had 
filed a complaint in unlawful detainer al-
leging ownership of the premises; the ex-
istence of the relationship of landlord and 
tenant between himself and defendants on 
a month to month basis under an oral agree-
ment; the service of written notice to quit 
the premises more than fifteen days prior 
to the termination of the monthly period; 
the refusal of the defendants to quit the 
premises; the amount of rent due and the 
amount of damages allegedly due for the 
unlawful detainer. There can be no doubt 
that the foregoing allegations were suf-
ficient to state a cause of action under Sec. 
104—60—3, U.C A. 1943, which section deals 
with the subject of unlawful detainer. 
However, plaintiff not only alleged the 
foregoing but also alleged as a right to 
institute these proceedings that defendants 
had unreasonably refused plaintiff entry 
to the premises for the purpose of inspec-
tion and had also unreasonably refused to 
allow prospective purchasers to view said 
premises and that this was a violation of 
Sec. 6, Subdivision 2 of the rent regula-
tion for housing accommodations, as 
promulgated by the Office of Price Ad-
ministration, Washington, D. C, as re-
vised under date of April 12, 1943. 
IvK\JtiS uiau (>4,j 
r.2d 642 
Defendants entered a general demurrer 
to the complaint. The court sustained 
this demurrer on the ground that plain-
tiff had failed to plead a right to enter 
the premises for the purpose of inspection 
or to show to prospective purchasers and 
therefore the complaint failed to state a 
cause of action. Upon plaintiff's refusal to 
plead further a judgment of dismissal was 
entered. 
Appellant assigns as error the court's 
finding that the complaint did not state 
a cause of action and entering a judgment 
of dismissal. 
Box Elder County, within which the 
property sought to be repossessed is 
situated, has been designated a defense 
rental area by the Office of Price Ad-
ministration and residential properties 
therein are subject to the rules and regula-
tions of that office. Sec. 1388.5056 of the 
rules and regulations of that office pro-
vides: 
"Restrictions on Removal of Tenant. So 
long as the tenant continues to pay the 
rent to which the landlord is entitled, no 
tenant shall be removed from any housing 
accommodation by an action to evict or 
to recover possession by exclusion from 
possession, or otherwise, nor shall any 
person attempt such removal or exclusion 
from possession, notwithstanding that such 
tenant has no lease or that his lease or 
other rental agreement has expired, or 
otherwise terminated, unless * * * 
"(2) The tenant has unreasonably re-
fused the landlord access to the housing 
accommodations for the purpose of in-
spection or of showing the accommoda-
tions to a prospective purchaser, mortgagee 
or prospective mortgagee, or other person 
having a legitimate interest therein, pro-
vided, however, that such refusal shall 
not be ground for removal or eviclion if 
such inspection or shozuing of the accommo-
dations is contrary to the provisions of 
the tenant's lease or other rental agree-
ment." [Italics ours.] 
The lower court reached its conclusion 
that the complaint failed to state a cause 
of action because plaintiff failed to af-
firmatively allege that the rental agreement 
reserved the right of inspection to the 
landlord and therefore did not show that 
subsection 2 quoted above was violated. 
It is plaintiff's contention the court erred 
in interpreting that portion of subsection 
2 which we have italicized, to mean that 
